User rights govern the methods by which a user can log on to a system. User rights are applied at the local computer level and allow users to perform tasks on a computer or a domain. User rights include logon rights and privileges. Logon rights control who is authorized to log on to a computer and how they can log on. Privileges control access to computer and domain resources and can override permissions that have been set on specific objects. Privileges are managed in Group Policy under the User Rights Assignment item. An example of a logon right is the ability to log on to a computer locally. An example of a privilege is the ability to shut down the computer. Both types of user rights are assigned by administrators to individual users or groups as part of the security settings for the computer. Each user right has a constant name and Group Policy name associated with it. The constant names are used when referring to the right in log events. You can configure the user rights assignment settings in the following location within the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC), Computer Configuration Windows Settings Security Settings Local Policies User Rights Assignment The following table identifies the user right short name and its associated friendly name as it appears in Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008. This policy setting determines which users can connect to the computer from the network. This capability is required by a number of network protocols, including Server Message Block (SMB)-based protocols, NetBIOS, Common Internet File System (CIFS), and Component Object Model Plus (COM+). ![]() ![]() Possible values: • User-defined list of accounts • Not Defined By default the members of the following groups have this right on workstations and servers: • Administrators • Backup Operators • Everyone • Users By default the members of the following groups have this right on domain controllers: • Administrators • Authenticated Users • Enterprise Domain Controllers • Everyone • Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access. Users who can connect from their computer to the network can access resources on target computers for which they have permission. For example, the Access this computer from the network user right is required for users to connect to shared printers and folders. If this user right is assigned to the Everyone group, anyone in the group can read the files in those shared folders. This situation is unlikely because the groups created by a default installation of Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista do not include the Everyone group. ![]() However, if a computer is upgraded to Windows Server 2008 or Windows Vista and the original computer includes the Everyone group as part of its defined users and groups, that group is transitioned as part of the upgrade process and is present on the system. If you remove the Access this computer from the network user right on domain controllers for all users, no one can log on to the domain or use network resources. If you remove this user right on member servers, users cannot connect to those servers through the network. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET or Internet Information Services (IIS), you may need to assign this user right to additional accounts that are required by those components. It is important to verify that authorized users are assigned this user right for the computers that they need to access the network. This policy setting determines whether a process can assume the identity of any user and thereby gain access to the resources that the user is authorized to access. ![]() All The Right Type 4 is web based touch typing software to improves techniques, speed and accuracy. We review the. You can enjoy a one-day free trial for the single user version and a 30 days free trial period for school (multi user) version, in this way you would know if this is the right software for you. Free Download For PC Windows.All The Right Type is a fun filled educational software intended for the purpose of improving and analyzing the typing capacity of the user. All The Right Type 4 Online School version. They can download All The Right Type 4 Online iPad® app for FREE and continue where they. All version of Windows. Typically, only low-level authentication services require this user right. Potential access is not limited to what is associated with the user by default. The calling process may request that arbitrary additional privileges be added to the access token. The calling process may also build an access token that does not provide a primary identity for auditing in the system event logs. Possible values: • User-defined list of accounts • Not Defined Default value: • Not defined. This policy setting determines which users can add a computer to a specific domain. For it to take effect, it must be assigned so that it applies to at least one domain controller. A user who is assigned this user right can add up to ten workstations to the domain. Users can also join a computer to a domain if they have the Create Computer Objects permission for an organizational unit (OU) or for the Computers container in the directory. Users who are assigned this permission can add an unlimited number of computers to the domain regardless of whether they have the Add workstations to domain user right. Possible values: • User-defined list of accounts • Not Defined Default value: • Authenticated Users group. The Add workstations to domain user right presents a moderate vulnerability. Users with this right could add a computer to the domain that is configured in a way that violates organizational security policies. For example, if your organization does not want its users to have administrative privileges on their computers, a user could install Windows on his or her computer and then add the computer to the domain. The user would know the password for the local administrator account, could log on with that account, and then add his or her domain account to the local Administrators group. Organizations that have not restricted users to roles with limited privileges may find it difficult to impose this countermeasure. Also, if you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET or IIS, you may need to assign the Adjust memory quotas for a process user right to additional accounts that are required by those components. IIS requires that this privilege be explicitly assigned to the IWAM_, Network Service, and Service accounts. Otherwise, this countermeasure should have no impact on most computers. If this user right is necessary for a user account, it can be assigned to a local computer account instead of a domain account. This policy setting determines which users can start an interactive session on the computer. Users who do not have this right are still able to start a remote interactive session on the computer if they have the Allow logon through Terminal Services right. Possible values: • User-defined list of accounts • Not Defined By default the members of the following groups have this right on workstations and servers: • Administrators • Backup Operators • Users By default the members of the following groups have this right on domain controllers: • Account Operators • Administrators • Backup Operators • Print Operators • Server Operators. If you remove these default groups, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET or IIS, you may need to assign the Allow log on locally user right to additional accounts that are required by those components. IIS requires that this user right be assigned to the IUSR_ account. You should confirm that delegated activities are not adversely affected by any changes that you make to the Allow log on locally user rights assignments. This policy setting determines which users can log on to the computer through a Remote Desktop connection. You should not assign this user right to additional users or groups. Instead, it is a best practice to add users to or remove users from the Remote Desktop Users group to control who can open a Remote Desktop connection to the computer. Possible values: • User-defined list of accounts • Not Defined By default members of the Administrators group have this right on domain controllers, workstations, and servers. The Remote Desktops Users group also has this right on workstations and servers. Caution For terminal servers that do run in Application Server mode, ensure that only users who require access to the server have accounts that belong to the Remote Desktop Users group because this built-in group has this logon right by default. Alternatively, you can assign the Deny Logon Through Terminal Services user right to groups such as Account Operators, Server Operators, and Guests. However, be careful when you use this method because you could block access to legitimate administrators who also happen to belong to a group that has the Deny Logon Through Terminal Services user right. This policy setting determines which users can circumvent file and directory permissions to back up the computer. This user right is effective only when an application attempts access through the NTFS backup application programming interface (API) through a backup tool such as NTBACKUP.EXE. Otherwise, standard file and directory permissions apply. Possible values: • User-defined list of accounts • Not Defined By default this right is granted to Administrators and Backup Operators on workstations and servers. On domain controllers, Administrators, Backup Operators, and Server Operators have this right. The default configuration for the Bypass traverse checking setting is to allow all users, including the Everyone group, to bypass traverse checking. Permissions to files and folders are controlled though appropriate configuration of file system access control lists (ACLs) because the ability to traverse the folder does not provide any read or write permissions to the user. The only scenario in which the default configuration could lead to a mishap would be if the administrator who configures permissions does not understand how this policy setting works. For example, the administrator might expect that users who are unable to access a folder are unable to access the contents of any child folders. Such a situation is unlikely, and, therefore, this vulnerability presents little risk. Organizations that are extremely concerned about security may want to remove the Everyone group, or perhaps even the Users group, from the list of groups with the Bypass traverse checking user right. Taking explicit control over traversal assignments can be an effective way to limit access to sensitive information. (Also, the Access–based Enumeration feature that was added in Windows Server® 2003 operating systems with Service Pack 1 (SP1) can be used. If you use access–based enumeration, users cannot see any folder or file to which they do not have access. For more information about this feature, see Access-based Enumeration (). The Windows operating systems, as well as many applications, were designed with the expectation that anyone who can legitimately access the computer will have this user right. Therefore, we recommend that you thoroughly test any changes to assignments of the Bypass traverse checking user right before you make such changes to production systems. In particular, IIS requires this user right to be assigned to the Network Service, Local Service, IIS_WPG, IUSR_, and IWAM_ accounts. (It must also be assigned to the ASPNET account through its membership in the Users group.) We recommend that you leave this policy setting at its default configuration. Users who can change the time on a computer could cause several problems. For example, time stamps on event log entries could be made inaccurate, time stamps on files and folders that are created or modified could be incorrect, and computers that belong to a domain may not be able to authenticate themselves or users who try to log on to the domain from them. Also, because the Kerberos authentication protocol requires that the requester and authenticator have their clocks synchronized within an administrator-defined skew period, an attacker who changes a computer's time may cause that computer to be unable to obtain or grant Kerberos tickets. The risk from these types of events is mitigated on most domain controllers, member servers, and end-user computers because the Windows Time service automatically synchronizes time with domain controllers in the following ways: • All client desktop computers and member servers use the authenticating domain controller as their inbound time partner. • All domain controllers in a domain nominate the primary domain controller (PDC) emulator operations master as their inbound time partner. • All PDC emulator operations masters follow the hierarchy of domains in the selection of their inbound time partner. • The PDC emulator operations master at the root of the domain is authoritative for the organization. Therefore, we recommend that you configure this computer to synchronize with a reliable external time server. This vulnerability becomes much more serious if an attacker is able to change the system time and then stop the Windows Time service or reconfigure it to synchronize with a time server that is not accurate. Caution A user account that is given this user right has complete control over the system and can lead to the system being compromised. We highly recommend that you do not assign any user accounts this right. The operating system examines a user's access token to determine the level of the user's privileges. Access tokens are built when users log on to the local computer or connect to a remote computer over a network. When you revoke a privilege, the change is immediately recorded, but the change is not reflected in the user's access token until the next time the user logs on or connects. Users with the ability to create or modify tokens can change the level of access for any currently logged on account. They could escalate their own privileges or create a DoS condition. Assign the Deny access to this computer from the network user right to the following accounts: • ANONYMOUS LOGON • Built-in local Administrator account • Local Guest account • All service accounts An important exception to this list is any service accounts that are used to start services that must connect to the computer over the network. For example, if you have configured a shared folder for Web servers to access and present content within that folder through a Web site, you may need to allow the account that runs IIS to log on to the server with the shared folder from the network. This user right is particularly effective when you must configure servers and workstations on which sensitive information is handled because of regulatory compliance concerns. This policy setting determines which users can change the Trusted for Delegation setting on a user or computer object in Active Directory Domain Services. Users and Computers that are assigned this user right must also have write access to the account control flags on the object. Delegation of authentication is a capability that multitiered client and server applications use. It allows a public-facing service to use client credentials to authenticate to an application or database service. For this configuration to be possible, both client and server must run under accounts that are trusted for delegation. Possible values: • User-defined list of accounts • Not Defined. This policy setting determines which programs are allowed to impersonate a user or another specified account and act on behalf of the user. If this user right is required for this kind of impersonation, an unauthorized user cannot cause a client to connect—for example, by remote procedure call (RPC) or named pipes—to a service that they have created to impersonate that client, which could elevate the unauthorized user's permissions to administrative or system levels. Services that are started by the Service Control Manager have the built-in Service group added by default to their access tokens. COM servers that are started by the COM infrastructure and configured to run under a specific account also have the Service group added to their access tokens. As a result, these processes are assigned this user right when they are started. Also, a user can impersonate an access token if any of the following conditions exist: • The access token that is being impersonated is for this user. • The user, in this logon session, logged on to the network with explicit credentials to create the access token. • The requested level is less than Impersonate, such as Anonymous or Identify. Because of these factors, users do not usually need to have this user right assigned. Possible values: • User-defined list of accounts • Not Defined. This policy setting determines which users can increase or decrease the size of a process's working set. The working set of a process is the set of memory pages currently visible to the process in physical RAM memory. These pages are resident and available for an application to use without triggering a page fault. The minimum and maximum working set sizes affect the virtual memory paging behavior of a process. Possible values: • User-defined list of accounts • Not Defined By default, standard users have this right. This policy setting determines which accounts can log on by using a batch-queue tool such as the Task Scheduler service. When an administrator uses the Add Scheduled Task wizard to schedule a task to run under a particular user name and password, that user is automatically assigned the Log on as a batch job user right. When the scheduled time arrives, the Task Scheduler service logs the user on as a batch job instead of as an interactive user, and the task runs in the user's security context. Possible values: • User-defined list of accounts • Not Defined. You should allow the computer to manage this logon right automatically if you want to allow scheduled tasks to run for specific user accounts. If you do not want to use the Task Scheduler in this manner, configure the Log on as a batch job user right for only the Local Service account. For IIS servers, you should configure this policy locally instead of through domain–based Group Policy settings so that you can ensure that the local IUSR_ and IWAM_ accounts have this logon right. If you configure the Log on as a batch job setting by using domain-based Group Policy settings, the computer cannot assign the user right to accounts that are used for scheduled jobs in the Task Scheduler. If you install optional components such as ASP.NET or IIS, you may need to assign this user right to additional accounts that are required by those components. For example, IIS requires assignment of this user right to the IIS_WPG group and the IUSR_, ASPNET, and IWAM_ accounts. If this user right is not assigned to this group and these accounts, IIS cannot run some COM objects that are necessary for proper functionality. This policy setting determines which users can specify object access audit options for individual resources such as files, Active Directory objects, and registry keys. Object access audits are not performed unless you enable them by using either the GPMC or the Auditpol command-line tool. A user who is assigned this user right can also view and clear the Security log in Event Viewer. For more information about audit policy, see the section of this guide. Possible values: • User-defined list of accounts • Not Defined. This policy setting determines which users can modify the integrity label of objects, such as files, registry keys, or processes owned by other users. The integrity label is used by the Windows Integrity Controls (WIC) feature and is new to Windows Vista. WIC keeps lower-integrity processes from modifying higher-integrity objects by assigning one of six possible labels to objects on the system. The following list describes the integrity levels in order from lowest to highest integrity: • Untrusted. Default assignment for processes that are logged on anonymously. Default assignment for processes that interact with the Internet. Default assignment for standard user accounts and any object not explicitly designated with a lower or higher integrity level. Default assignment for administrator accounts and processes that request to run using administrative rights. Default assignment for Windows kernel and core services. Used by setup programs to install software. It is important that only trusted software is installed on computers because objects that are assigned the Installer integrity level can install, modify, and uninstall all other objects. Possible values: • User-defined list of accounts • Not Defined By default no user accounts are given this right. Modify an object label is a powerful user right and it should be closely guarded. Anyone with this user right can change the integrity level of a file or process so that it becomes elevated or decreased to a point where it can be deleted by lower-level processes. Either of these states effectively circumvents the protection offered by Windows Integrity Controls and makes your system vulnerable to attacks by malicious software. If malicious software is set with an elevated integrity level such as Trusted Installer or System, administrator accounts do not have sufficient integrity levels to delete the program from the system. In that case, use of the Modify an object label right is mandated so that the object can be relabeled. However, the relabeling must occur by using a process that is at the same or a higher level of integrity than the object that you are attempting to relabel. This security setting determines who can modify firmware environment values. The effect of the setting depends on the processor. On x86-based computers, the only firmware environment value that can be modified by assigning this user right is the Last Known Good Configuration setting, which should only be modified by the system. On Itanium-based computers, boot information is stored in nonvolatile RAM. Users must be assigned this user right to run bootcfg.exe and to change the Default Operating System setting on Startup and Recovery in System Properties. On all computers, this user right is required to install or upgrade Windows. Anyone who has the Remove computer from docking station user right can log on and then remove a portable computer from its docking station. If this setting is not defined, it has the same effect as if everyone were granted this right. However, the value of implementing this countermeasure is reduced by the following factors: • If attackers can restart the computer, they could remove it from the docking station after the BIOS starts but before the operating system starts. • This setting does not affect servers because they typically are not installed in docking stations. • An attacker could steal the computer and the docking station together. • Computers that can be mechanically undocked can be physically removed by the user whether or not they use the Windows undocking functionality. By default, only members of the local Administrators group are granted this right. Other user accounts must be explicitly granted the right as necessary. If your organization's users are not members of the local Administrators groups on their portable computers, they cannot remove their own portable computers from their docking stations without shutting them down first. Therefore, you may want to assign the Remove computer from docking station privilege to the local Users group for portable computers. This policy setting determines which parent processes can replace the access token that is associated with a child process. In Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, there are a significantly larger number of service hosts than in Windows Server 2003. This is because, in Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista, multiple services with the same access and security requirements are collected together and run in a common environment to reduce boot time and system overhead, instead of running many services in separate memory spaces. Possible values: • User-defined list of accounts • Not Defined. An attacker with the Restore files and directories user right could restore sensitive data to a computer and overwrite data that is more recent, which could lead to loss of important data, data corruption, or a DoS condition. Attackers could overwrite executable files that are used by legitimate administrators or system services with versions that include malicious software to grant themselves elevated privileges, compromise data, or install programs that provide for continued access to the computer. The ability to shut down domain controllers should be limited to a very small number of trusted administrators. Although the Shut down the system user right requires the ability to log on to the server, you should be very careful about which accounts and groups that you allow to shut down a domain controller. When a domain controller is shut down, it is no longer available to process logons, serve Group Policy, and answer Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) queries. If you shut down domain controllers that possess Flexible Single–Master Operations (FSMO) roles, you can disable key domain functionality, such as processing logons for new passwords—the Primary Domain Controller (PDC) Emulator role. For other server roles, especially those where non-administrators have rights to log on to the server (such as terminal servers), it is critical that this privilege be removed from users that do not have a legitimate reason to restart the servers. The Synchronize directory service data user right affects domain controllers; only domain controllers should be able to synchronize directory service data. Domain controllers have this user right inherently because the synchronization process runs in the context of the System account on domain controllers. Attackers who have this user right can view all information stored within the directory. They could then use some of that information to facilitate additional attacks or expose sensitive data, such as direct telephone numbers or physical addresses. Contrary to what some ads say, saving money on your energy bills is not the reason to replace your windows. That’s because it could take decades to recoup the $8,000 to $24,000 you’ll spend on new windows and installation. Energy Star-qualified windows can lower your energy bills by 7 to 15 percent. That’s only about $27 to $111 per year for a 2,000-square-foot, single-story home with storm or double-pane windows, or $126 to $465 if that home has just single-pane windows. So why bother? New windows can make your home quieter, more attractive, and less drafty, and they don’t need painting. They’re also easier to clean than old windows with combination storm and screens and can reduce your carbon footprint. To check which windows can keep out rain and wind without leaking, we tested 21 double-hung and four casement-style windows, two of the most popular configurations. We found significant differences between brands in types and frame materials. Working with an outside lab, we subjected the windows to heavy, wind-driven rain and winds of 25 and 50 mph at outdoor temperatures of 0° F and 70° F. Replacing windows involves many decisions. If you want new windows, we’ll help you choose the best ones for your home. Here’s what you need to know. Price doesn’t indicate performance Among double-hung clad wood windows, a pricey and bottom-rated, $500, wasn’t good at keeping out cold air and was so-so at keeping out rain. A $450 vinyl double-hung was impressive, but a top-rated $260 was even better. All of the casement windows aced all tests. Prices varied by frame material; the top-scoring vinyl window, $260, is the least expensive casement. All prices are for a 3x5-foot window. Match windows to climate Look at the overall scores in our, then zero in on test results that apply to where you live. If your home is exposed to high winds and cold temperatures, look for windows that were excellent at low-temperature wind resistance. Don’t overspend on options Upgrades can easily add 50 percent or more to the base cost of a window. Focus on features that add value. Low-E coatings improve efficiency, but triple glazing probably isn’t necessary unless you live in an extremely cold climate. Double-hung window sashes that tilt in make cleaning easier, and full screens allow optimum airflow when the top window is lowered and bottom window raised. Finer meshed screens let more light through and do not obscure the view as much as standard screens. Frame provides structure. Cladding protects the exterior of a wood or composite window and is made of vinyl, aluminum, or fiberglass, eliminating painting. Sash is the moving part of the window; it can be tilted in for easy cleaning. Insulated glass Double-glazed windows have a sealed space between two panes of glass filled with air or another gas that insulates better than air. Argon gas is standard on many windows, but the energy savings won’t justify paying extra for it. Low-E coating is transparent and improves the efficiency of the glass by reflecting heat yet letting light in. The coating is applied to the outside of glass in warmer climates to reflect the sun’s heat out; in colder areas, it’s applied to the inside glass to keep heat in. Grilles are decorative and are available in different patterns to match architectural styles. Know the numbers You’ll see these numbers on Energy Star and National Fenestration Rating Council window labels: U-factor, or U-value, usually ranges from 0.20 to 1.20. The lower the number, the better the window is at keeping heat in. Solar heat gain coefficient is between 0 and 1. The lower the number, the better the window is at blocking unwanted heat from the sun. In warm climates, you’ll want the lowest number you can find; in cold areas a higher number is better. Visible transmittance indicates how much visible light a window lets in and is between 0 and 1. As the number increases, so does the light. Even if you choose budget-friendly windows, upgrades can easily add 50 percent or more to their cost. Here’s a look at upgrades and starting prices for a 3x5-foot double-hung window, according to experts at Pella. Feature Details Grilles between the glass (GBG), $20 Installed between layers of insulated glass, these add a more traditional look, without having to clean individual sections of glass. Hardware-finish upgrades, $50 Oil-rubbed bronze or satin nickel ups the price. Impact-resistant glass, $325 It may be required in hurricane zones. It also reduces noise. Jamb extensions, $50 The factory adds depth to the window frame when the frame isn’t as thick as the wall. Nonstandard colors for exterior cladding, $25 Nice but not necessary. Prefinished interiors on wood windows, $100 The factory paints or stains the interiors so that you don’t have to. Simulated divided light grilles (SDL), $150 Grilles are adhered to both the room side and exterior of the glass for a more authentic look. This may be required in historic districts. Triple insulating glass (triple IG), $100 Adds a third layer of glass, which reduces noise significantly. Energy savings are also improved, but not enough to justify the cost in all but extremely cold climates.
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